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Abstract
The state and its role in technological innovation and social justice have become, once
again, fashionable topics of political and economic debate. A number of innovation
theorists argue that never more than today, it is necessary to rethink the state’s
entrepreneurial role in society and welfare. Their argument provides justification for
the existence of the state, going beyond classical political theory and especially
contractarian accounts of legitimacy and obligation. It emphasises the ability and
willingness of the state to take risks and reduce uncertainty of economic agents for
the sake of innovation that can make everyone better off. This paper insists that
although the risk-taking argument of innovation theorists deserves further attention
and analysis, it should not be abstracted from a holistic politico-theoretical approach to
the state. Such an approach is necessary for a critical understanding of the complex set
of predominantly political institutions which compose the state and which have been
historically developed to guarantee social evolution. Any risk-taking for innovative
enterprise and mission-oriented investment ought to be justified and legitimised on the
grounds of principled democratic procedures. This implies that innovation itself is a
value-laden political process, requiring participation in the decision-making and stan-
dards of fairness.
Keywords Entrepreneurial state . Innovation . Social justice . Schumpeter . Political
economy
1 Introduction
In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the state and its role in technological
innovation and social justice appear to have become, once again, fashionable topics of
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political and economic debate. A number of innovation and political theorists
(Mazzucato 2014, 2016; Perez 2016; Schot and Steinmueller 2016; Lundvall 2013;
Block and Keller 2011) argue that never more than today, it is necessary to rethink the
state’s entrepreneurial role1 in society and welfare. Their argument provides justifica-
tion for the existence of the state not only as a set of institutions that guarantees social
evolution through protection of markets but also as an entity capable of creation of
markets in risky areas of knowledge and technology. This renewed defence of the state
moves beyond classical political theory and especially contractarian theories of legit-
imacy and political obligation (Hobbes 1991; Locke 1960; Rousseau 1968). It empha-
sises the ability and willingness of the state to take risks and reduce uncertainty of
economic agents for the sake of innovation that can make everyone better off.
This paper insists that although the risk-taking argument of innovation theorists
deserves further attention and analysis, it should not be abstracted from a holistic
politico-theoretical approach to the state. Such an approach is necessary for a critical
understanding of the complex set of predominantly political institutions which compose
the state and more specifically, the democratic state that legitimises particular forms of
risk-taking. Given that the authority of the democratic state (i.e. the power to shape
discourses and behaviours) is derived from people2 themselves (Hay and Lister 2006),
any risk-taking for innovative enterprise and mission-oriented investment (Mazzucato
and Pena 2015) ought to be justified and legitimised on the grounds of principled
democratic procedures. This implies that mission-led innovation itself is a value-laden
political process (Papaioannou and Srinivas 2018), requiring democratic participation
of various publics in the decision-making and standards of fairness. Otherwise, it might
lose legitimacy or become an instrument in the hands of an authoritarian state.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the return of
the state in innovation. Section 3 briefly revisits competing theories of the state.
Section 4 discusses different forms of the entrepreneurial state and examines their
legitimacy constraints. Section 5 focuses on mission-oriented innovation as a political
process that has to address the question of fairness through social redistributive policies.
Section 6 analyses the new role of the state in socially just innovation. Section 7
concludes by summarising the overall argument of the paper.
2 The return of the state in innovation
The modern notion of the state originates in the seventieth century political theory and
practice when it emerged as a complex set of institutions claiming sovereignty for itself
and enjoying monopoly over the legitimate use of power within a defined territory.
According to Hay and Lister (2006: p. 7) ‘The state is referred to for the first time as a
distinct apparatus of government which rulers have a duty to maintain and which will
outlast their rule, as opposed to an extension of the latter’s innate authority’. This
modern notion of the state that is separate from the powers of the ruler (government)
1 By using the term ‘entrepreneurship’ I mean risk-taking for setting up innovative businesses and creating
new markets.
2 Various political theories have used different terms to describe the ‘people’ who grant the state ‘authority’
including ‘citizens’, ‘taxpayers’ and ‘men’.
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and the ruled (citizens) and has distinct functions to perform in economy and society
(e.g. protection of private property and national security) became dominant in political
studies but not in innovation studies.
In fact, until very recently, the notion of the state as a political institution that has a role
to play in the generation of new knowledge and technologies was absent from the area of
innovation studies. Hundred years ago, the founding father of this inter-disciplinary area,
Joseph Schumpeter (1983), saw clearly the interplay between politics and economics,
influencing the ideas of Freeman (1974, 1981), Freeman and Perez (1988), Nelson (1984),
Lundvall (1985, 1992) and other neo-Schumpeterian thinkers. However, for more than
two decades (1990–2010), political notions such as the state had almost vanished from
academic and policy debates on technological change and progress. Even the ‘Triple
Helix’ and the ‘Innovation Systems’ theories which focus on complex institutional
dynamics such as university-industry-government relations and their impact on innova-
tion tended to reduce the role of the state in facilitating interactive learning and regulating
markets (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 1995; Leydesdorff and Meyer 2006; Nelson 1992;
Lundvall 2007). This is partly because of the fact that politics and the state were attacked
and increasingly dismantled during the peak of neo-liberalism in Western economies
(Mazzucato 2014) and partly because of the domination of innovation studies by liberal
economists whowere sceptical of the importance of politics for understanding economics.
The latter has overwhelmingly focused on efficiency and growth, overlooking the
distributional effects of innovation which are by definition political (Breznitz and
Zehavi 2013). It took years to innovation scholars to confess that:
Our field [innovation studies] has uneasy relationship with public administration
as well as politics. No doubt this is partly the consequence of the fact that so
many of us are economists, a tribe that paradoxically dominates public adminis-
tration while at the same time harbouring severe doubts about public purposes.
This is reflected in our programmes of research and training – we rarely engage
with scholars of law, public administration, social policy, or education and even
less often with political theory, ethics, or philosophy. (Steinmueller 2013: p. 161).
Although in the 1990s only a few studies emphasised the interdisciplinarity of innova-
tion, engaging with some of these scholars, in the early 2010s, the relationship between
innovation studies and political studies begun to warm up again. It was when a number
of innovation scholars and political scientists (Mazzucato 2014; Lundvall 2013; Block
and Keller 2011; Vallas et al. 2011; Papaioannou 2011; Kaplinsky 2011) discovered that
technological progress would not automatically lead to social progress and that the state
was in fact behind almost all investments in radical technological revolutions, including
the Internet and digital revolution. According to Block (2011; p. 3):
The historical experience with the innovation economy provides powerful argu-
ments against the core assumptions of market fundamentalism. For many tech-
nologies, it has not been Adam Smith’s invisible hand, but the hand of govern-
ment that has proven decisive in their development. Moreover, the innovation
economy depends on a series of principles that are at fundamental variance with
market fundamentalism.
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To support their argument, Block and Keller (2011) as well as other contributors to
their edited volume provide a wealth of cases about the state’s involvement in techno-
logical innovation. One of these cases is the making of US biotechnology. Vallas et al.
(2011) examine the role of federal policy in fostering the birth of this industry. As they
point out:
Where most previous accounts assume that the biotechnology revolution was
spontaneously generated by confluence of scientific discovery and profit seeking
incentives, we contend that political structures and federal policy have played an
equally critical but yet insufficiently acknowledged role…Put simply, we contend
that explosive growth of biotechnology industry was in many senses orchestrated
and shaped from above as an expression of federal initiatives.
The same holds for other civilian technologies, including the web, algorithmic search,
the iPhone and the GPS technologies.
The return of the state in innovation was essentially confirmed in 2014 with the
publication of Mazzucato’s work on The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs.
Private Sector Myths. This work follows a trend of state intervention theory and/or
reaffirms the idea of strategic state3 that has been around for more than half century.
Before Mazzucato, Schumpeter (1939), Keynesian, neo-Keynesian and Marxist theo-
rists, including Polanyi (1944) and much later Block (1987), debunked the myth of self-
regulating markets and stressed the crucial role of the state in economic growth. More
recently, other theorists such as Yu (2001: p. 753) criticised the absence of analysis of
entrepreneurship in the public sector and insisted that ‘Without entrepreneurial spirit,
one cannot fully understand the underlying reasons for policy changes and more
importantly of institutional changes.’ Yu draws on the experience of Asian economies
in which governments take a leading role in industrialisation. He explains their
dynamic growth in terms of the entrepreneurial state. Another theorist, Ebner (2009:
p. 370) also ‘… perceives an entrepreneurial role of the state as an integrated compo-
nent of economic evolution’. But Mazzucato goes further than Yu and Ebner, arguing
that the state is not a simple facilitator of economic growth. Rather, it should be
understood as a key partner of the private sector when it comes to searching for growth
and technological change. This partnership includes offering knowledge platforms,
mobilising and empowering actors, co-creating process and product innovations.4
Mazzucato’s argument clearly intends to move the current political and economic
debate away from ‘market failure’ and ‘state failure’ justifications. Such justifications
might indeed encourage policies to fund basic research and infrastructure projects in
order to deal with the unwillingness of private firms to invest in high-risk areas.
However, they might not push the state to play a ‘visionary strategic role’ in the
economy and society. For Mazzucato, that is precisely the problem with current
economic theory that guides public policy. It is not inspiring enough of visionary state
actions for innovation. Thus, Mazzucato (2014: p. 23) insists that the state needs to be
entrepreneurial in order to engage in risk-taking and the creation of a new vision, rather
than just fixing market failures. Industrial policy of the entrepreneurial state should
3 This point was made by one of REPE reviewers. I would like to thank him/her for the contribution.
4 This point was made by one of the REPE reviewers. I would like to thank him/her for the contribution.
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become the driving engine of technological innovations which can help accomplish
grand missions, e.g. eradicating poverty.
The question that arises is whether any state can become entrepreneurial, playing
this new role for a long time, or there are moral, political, epistemological and even
contextual constrains to certain forms of state, preventing them from adopting the
strategic vision of risk-taking. For example, can relatively young states in the contexts
of developing countries become entrepreneurial, taking risks and engaging in co-
creation activities with innovators and communities? The answer seems to be in the
negative since several developing states especially in North and Sub-Saharan Africa
either institutionally lack capacity or fail to perform certain functions, including
protection of citizens against fraud and/or theft. Schumpeter was well aware of the
importance of institutional specificities of the state in different contexts and historical
times. In his theory ‘Country-specific features of the state are derived from institutional
settings and social structures as well as from the nature of wealth that reflects the
pattern of the development process’ (Ebner 2009: p. 372). By contrast, Mazzucato and
contemporary innovation theorists put forward an abstract theory of the entrepreneurial
state. Even so, what they have in mind is clearly the nation state in the Western world
and perhaps established and emerging state powers in Asia, including China and India.
For this reason, it might make more sense to address the above question first in the
context of Western liberal state formation and then in the context of high technology
(where the main focus of innovation theorists is). For example, can neo-liberal or
libertarian forms of state become truly entrepreneurial?
Defenders of neo-liberal or libertarian forms of state were rather quick to dismiss
the innovation theorists’ argument for the entrepreneurial state as partisan and
shaky in terms of historical evidence. For instance, Worstall (2013) contests the
entrepreneurial state argument on the grounds that technological innovation is not a
public good and therefore the government is not justified to support research and
development (R&D). In a similar manner, Mingardi (2015: p. 608) argues that ‘…in
many respects it [the entrepreneurial state argument] suffers from the “is-ought”
problem – that is, it makes too many claims about what we ought to be based on
statements of what is’. He therefore accuses innovation theorists and especially
Mazzucato, for developing arbitrary arguments, overemphasising ‘a tiny bit of
history’ of the twentieth century and failing to provide a holistic historical perspec-
tive, including the nineteenth century industrialisation that was independent of huge
public investment in R&D. In short, Mingardi regards the entrepreneurial state
theory as ideological and biased towards a strong public sector. However, analysing
his argument, one might also brand it as ideological, suffering from exactly the
same problem: lack of historical evidence. Mingardi’s only counter historical
examples are focused on the Industrial Revolution, e.g. railways, failing to accept
the fact that involvement of the state has been key for setting up collaborative
knowledge and innovation ecosystems that delivered new technologies as both
intended and unintended consequences of industrial policy. Overemphasising the
role of the private sector and dismissing the historical importance of state industrial
policy are rather unconvincing strategies for defeating the entrepreneurial state
argument of innovation theorists. Although it is true that this argument implies
businesses take less risk than the state (Westlake 2014), it is also true that the latter
has more substantial involvement in early stages of technological invention than the
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former. As Block (2018: p. 29) suggests in his latest work on Capitalism: the
Future of an Illusion:
…within the parameters of an economy with private ownership and the pursuit of
profitability, there is still very wide leeway to decide how large or small a role the
state will play, how much inequality will be tolerated, and how deep and broad
democratic governance will be.
Block’s suggestion is a response to ‘capitalist illusionists’ such as Mingardi who tend to
see the market economy as being free, coherent and above all self-regulating organism
that has its own DNA. This view of the market economy fails to understand the micro-
level technology development and the role of the state policy in stimulating innovation.
As Lall and Teubal (1998) point out, there is no such thing as a market for setting
priorities in technology. Visionary and strategic choices have to be made by govern-
ments. However, governments can often choose to be only mobilizers and as such
incapable of orchestrating local industries.
Of course, despite the strength of their argument, it is fair to say that Block and
innovation theorists, including Mazzucato, neither define the state nor provide a holistic
theory of the state functions and institutions. Therefore, in their theory, certain histor-
ical, political, epistemological and contextual constraints of the state are ignored or
overlooked in such way that a false impression is given: all forms of the state can
potentially be entrepreneurial without constraints and legitimacy conditions. Thus, for
innovation theorists, it is simply a matter of convincing governments, no matter their
liberal democratic or authoritarian profile, about the importance of mission-oriented
innovations of the state. As such, their argument for a strategic vision of risk-taking is
predominantly political. It requires the political design of institutions such as BNDES,
Brazil’s national development bank and SITRA, Finland’s national innovation agency
to promote innovation through risky investments. Therefore, the key issue is what
politico-theoretical understanding of the state is presupposed of their argument. To
address this issue, one should be briefly reminded of the classical, modern and
contemporary theories of the state. One should revisit the rationales of these theories
for and against specific state functions. The origins of the state are very much
associated with these competing theories (Jessop 2016).
3 Competing theories of the state
To begin with classical theories of the state, these include Machiavelli’s The Prince
(1532), Hobbes Leviathan (1651), Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (1698) and
Rousseau’s The Social Contract (1762). Despite their differences and distinct argu-
ments, these theories are concerned with justifying the state as a neutral agent and
benevolent authority that sets the terms and the conditions of social evolution. There-
fore, political obligation is translated into a process through which each individual
accepts to become subject of the state, owing duties to the state itself (Hay et al. 2006).
In the case of Machiavelli and Hobbes, the authority of the state is absolute. Although
Machiavelli’s Prince claims absolute authority over a specific geographical area,
Hobbes’ Leviathan maintains peace in the transition from the state of nature to civil
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society. For Hobbes, the state of nature is synonymous to war and therefore the
Leviathan is justified as an absolute authority that claims and enjoys a monopoly over
legitimate use of force to achieve its objectives. In his famous passage, in Chapter XIV,
he stresses:
And because the condition of man (as hath been declared in the precedent
chapter) is a condition of warre of everyone against everyone; in wich case
everyone is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make
use of, that may not be a help into him in preserving his life against his enemies.
It followeth, that in such condition, every man has a Right to everything; even to
on another’s’ body. And therefore, as long as this natural Right of everyman to
everything endureth, there can be no security to any man…(Hobbes 1991: p. 91).
Hobbes clearly understands the rationale and key function of the state to be the
authoritarian maintenance of peace and security in civil society. Therefore, he is against
functions which might bring war back to civil society, including the distribution of
certain liberties, e.g. individual rights. By contrast, Locke and Rousseau understand the
rationale for the state to be the liberal maintenance of freedom in civil society through
general rules that everyone can observe and follow. For both thinkers, the hypothetical
state of nature is an inconvenient state of affairs, and therefore, there is advantage for
people to accept the political state as a neutral authority that equally preserves the
property and freedom of everyone. According to Locke:
…in the State of Nature, everyone has the Executive Power of the Law of Nature,
I doubt not but it will be objected, That it is unreasonable for Men to be judges in
their own cases, that self-love will make Men partial to themselves and their
Friends …And hence nothing but confusion and Disorder will follow, and that
therefore God hath certainly appointed Government to restrain the partiality and
violence of Man. I easily grant, that Civil Government is the proper Remedy for
the inconveniences of the State of Nature …(Locke 1960: p. 275).
Locke, of course, provides a theological explanation of the emergence of the liberal
state. By contrast, Rousseau’s explanation is based on his theory of the general will of
people to bring about a social contract for their transition from the state of nature to
civil society and the sovereign political state. Rousseau stresses:
…although in civil societyman surrenders some of the advantages that belong to the
state of nature, he gains in return far greater ones; his faculties are so exercised and
developed, his mind is so enlarged, his sentiments so ennobled… what main loses
by the social contract is his natural liberty and the absolute right to anything that
tempts him and that he can take; what he gains by the social contract is his civil
liberty and the legal right of property in what possesses (Rousseau 1968: p. 64).
Classical political theorists’ understanding of the state as an authority or sovereign that
comes about to guarantee either the security or the freedom of civil society implies that
legitimacy depends on how well these two primary functions are performed. It also
implies that the state is able, through its apparatus, to accumulate the necessary
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knowledge for such performance. The state has distinctive capacities which, according
to Marsh (1999: p. 84), arise from two sources:
The first broad source is the public policy agenda. This is the deposit of an
extended historical process. The historical residues include collective attachment
to particular values, aspirations and anxieties. These frame the agendas that
political leaders champion … The second source of distinctive state capacities
arises from institutions through which the broader community and particular
interests are mobilised, and through which information is disseminated.
Modern theorists of the state such as Max Weber also see it as an organisation that
deploys legitimate coercion and physical force to protect citizens’ private property and
ensure they are free to exchange goods in the market. Coercive policy instruments are
underwritten by legal authority of the state. As Weber points out:
…a compulsory political organisation with continuous operations will be called a
“state” in so far as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the
monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order
(Weber 1978: p. 54).
Weber distinguishes between the state and government. Indeed, while governments
change very often, the state, as a set of complex institutions, persists and evolves over
time (Hay and Lister 2006).
On this point, Weber is also in agreement with Marx. Of course, Marx criticised the
liberal state as an instrument of the ruling class. This instrument is structurally
dependent on the economic base of society, i.e. capitalism. Indeed for Marx (1967),
any form of political organisation, including the state, corresponds to the form of
economic organisation. However, he also recognised the dynamism and the power of
the capitalist state. In his Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State, he insists the set of
complex institutions that forms the state is not static but is evolving through the
relationship between freedom and necessity (Marx 1975).
Although Marx never provided a complete theory of the state, his instrumen-
talist position has become very influential among Marxists and neo-Marxists.
From Lenin and Gramsci to Miliband, Poulantzas and Jessop, these approaches
emphasise the role of the state in reproducing exploitative capitalist relations in
the market. However, they also stress the importance of non-economic factors,
including discursive factors of morality, politics and culture, for consolidating the
hegemony of the ruling class over the working class (Gramsci 1971). Although
these factors are causally less determinant of the state than economic structures,
they should not be overlooked. According to Poulantzas (2014), the state enjoys a
relative autonomy from the ruling class and from society. Autonomy implies the
ability of the state to take an independent view of its vision and strategic economic
priorities. To put it another way, it is not simply an instrument, as Miliband (1969)
thought, in the hands of the ruling class or an apparatus, as Althusser (1971)
thought, in charge of social cohesion in a class-divided society. Rather, it is a
social relationship. According to Poulantzas (2014: p. 128), the state:
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…like “capital” it is rather a relationship of forces, or more precisely the material
condensation of such relationship among classes and class fractions, such as this
is expressed within the state in a necessarily specific form.
This implies that the state is not a ‘unified thing or unitary subject’ (Jessop 2016: p. 54).
Rather, it is a relational apparatus of conflicts and contradictions between forces which
affect the exercise of power. Yet the state often seeks to become the ‘custodian’ of the
general interest of capital, as Block (1987) points out. Within complex dialectic of
structures and strategies (Jessop 1990), the capitalist state unfolds as a system that is
more open to some political strategies which promote capital accumulation than others.
Indeed, following Poulantzas, contemporary Marxists such as Jessop emphasise these
strategic-relational aspects of the state, closing the gap between structure and agency.
The state becomes an uneven playing field that is characterised by both indeterminacy
and contingency. According to Jessop (2016: p. 10):
Broad economic and political visions as well as specific policy paradigms are
relevant here. Given the multiplicity of competing visions (at most we find a
temporarily dominant or hegemonic discourse) that orient the actions of political
forces, this reinforces the view of the state as a polyvalent, polycontextual
ensemble.
Contemporary neo-Marxist approaches to the state are contested by liberal pluralists
and neo-liberal theorists of public choice who argue that state power is (and ought to
be) limited. According to this argument, the limits of the state are not just moral in the
sense of lacking justification for interfering with individual freedom in the market but
also political and epistemological. First of all, political power is (and ought to be)
distributed to different groups of civil society, including lobbying organisations. Early
advocates of liberal pluralism such as Laski (1989) criticised the authoritarian state as
illiberal and pointed out the importance of constraining those state functions which
threat individual freedom. Later pluralists such as Hirst (1989) pointed out the diversity
of organisations which prevent the dominance of one particular idea.
The importance of liberty and the distrust of the state are also characteristics of the
public choice approach to institutions. Theorists such as Buchanan (1988) and Tullock
(1976), and earlier than them Hayek (1978) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963),
employed economic methods for the study of politics. As Buchanan (1986: pp. 25–
26) sets the whole issue of the theory of public choice ‘it is only when the homo-
economicus postulate about human behaviour is combined with politics-as-exchange
paradigm that the economic theory of politics emerges from despair’. This implies that
political institutions such as the state were explained in terms of utility maximisation or
unintended consequences of self-interested individual actions in the market. Only if the
latter failed to deliver innovation and prosperity, the state would be justified to
intervene in order to fix the problem. Some public choice theorists considered both
the market and the state to be imperfect mechanisms. They viewed entrepreneurs and
politicians alike as short-term decision-makers. Those who cause markets and states to
fail are self-interested individuals with bounded rationality (Simon 1991). When
markets fail, certain phenomena such as monopolies and negative externalities need
to be corrected by the state.
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However, some other theorists, e.g. Hayek (1960), raise epistemological objections
to state intervention. In their view, human knowledge is limited and therefore the
human mind cannot fully grasp complex phenomena such as the market, let alone
fixing them through political institutions. Theorists such as Hayek and later Nozick
(1974) endeavour to make the epistemological and moral case for a neo-liberal or
libertarian minimal state. The latter is only legitimate to provide national defence and
policy services to citizens, avoiding redistributive functions (Papaioannou 2010, 2012).
4 Forms of the entrepreneurial state and their legitimacy constraints
The return of the state in innovation, especially through Mazzucato’s argument about
the strategic vision of risk-taking, is driven by a policy critique of the public choice
theory of market failure (Mazzucato 2014). However, it fails to acknowledge compet-
ing theories of the Western liberal state which identify certain political constraints and
conditions of legitimacy for each form of the state. It might be argued that the proposed
alternative of the entrepreneurial state, even though plausible and empirically founded,
cannot take any form of the state without such constraints and conditions in place. This
implies that its strategic vision of risk-taking is constrained by the legitimacy require-
ments of each form of the state whether authoritarian, liberal, relative autonomous
welfare state and neo-liberal or libertarian state. In other words, no form of the state can
be legitimate to impose its risk-taking vision on citizens unless the envisaged innova-
tion can support its basic functions. Lack of legitimacy implies lack of collective or
national mobilisation for mission-oriented innovations through risky instruments. Let
us now examine the legitimacy constraints of each form of the state in relation to
innovation theorists’ risk-taking vision in more detail.
Take first the form of an authoritarian entrepreneurial state, in Hobbesian terms. This
would be a state that is only legitimate to impose the risk-taking vision on citizens for
the sake of peace and security of civil society. This implies using coercion and physical
force to push forward undemocratically decided mission-oriented investments for
certain innovations, e.g. defence and surveillance technologies, which could maximise
social distributive benefits for citizens. But if such benefits, especially peace and
security for citizens, are not achieved (or are compromised) in the innovative outcome
of these mission-oriented investments, then an authoritarian state in Hobbesian terms
would no longer be permitted to function as an entrepreneurial state. To put it another
way, a Hobbesian form of entrepreneurial state is perfectly possible provided it can
support the distributive functions of protecting peace and security in authoritarian ways,
e.g. suppressing human rights and coercing citizens. In fact, states such as China and
Singapore appear to have similarities with this constrained form of entrepreneurial
state. The authoritarian missions of these states in certain areas of industrial innovation
have delivered benefits to citizens since World War II. By assuming entrepreneurial
roles via corporations and government investments, Asian authoritarian states have
promoted innovative industries for future growth, e.g. ICT, automobiles, biotechnolo-
gy, and micro-electronics. However, at the same time, they have also suppressed
human rights and individual freedoms through their undemocratic mission-led innova-
tions. The theory of entrepreneurial state does not exclude the possibility of authori-
tarian mission-oriented innovations which are founded upon undemocratic nations of
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security and not upon democratic processes of participation. Rather, what the theory
does is to tolerate authoritarianism as long as missions are innovative.
Another constrained form of entrepreneurial state might be a liberal capitalist state in
Lockean or Rousseauan terms. This state would negotiate its risk-taking vision through
a social contract for the sake of individual freedom and private property. This would
imply formal democratic participation in the decision-making process for investments
which are likely to contribute to individual freedom and protect private property
institutions. However, if such contributions did not take place (or failed to deliver),
then a liberal capitalist state in Lockean or Rousseauan terms would no longer be
legitimate to function as an entrepreneurial state. That is to say, a liberal capitalist form
of entrepreneurial state is perfectly possible provided it can support the democratic
functions of protecting individual property rights and freedoms in liberal ways, e.g.
guaranteeing individual rights via a liberal constitution and promoting free exchange of
products and services in the market. Several liberal capitalist states in Europe have
faced legitimation crises as entrepreneurial states, e.g. France, Germany and Italy,
simply because of their inability to withstand accusations of violating constitutional
individual freedoms and private property rights in the market or because of their
tendency to pick up industrial winners, violating the liberal principle of state neutrality
towards different conceptions of the (technological) good. The theory of entrepreneur-
ial state does not suggest that mission-oriented innovations should by definition be in
line with human rights such as individual freedom and private property. Therefore, such
innovations can easily violate fundamental principles of liberalism for the sake of
accomplishing a mission.
A third constrained form of entrepreneurial state might be a welfare state. The latter
would still be a capitalist state that is relatively autonomous of the ruling class. This form
of the state would promote risk-taking as a political strategy as long as it contributes to
increase of social welfare without threatening the narrow interests of the ruling class in
capital accumulation. In this sense, mission-oriented investments for generating innova-
tion and growth would be conditional to maximisation of social welfare. This implies, in
case that social welfare is not maximised by the innovative outcome of such investments
or the interests of the ruling class are compromised by innovative technologies, a welfare
state would be criticised for lack of legitimacy to function as entrepreneurial state. This
sort of critique was already made to the UK state’s missions in the 1970s, accusing it of
creating new poverty and thereby opening the door to neo-liberalism in the 1980s. To put
it another way, a welfarist form of entrepreneurial state is perfectly possible provided it
can support key welfarist functions, e.g. maximising aggregate preference satisfaction.
However, this does not always happen. Often, mission-oriented innovations lose sight of
their purpose and end up undermining social welfare. Block and Keller (2011) and
Mazzucato (2016) provide a number of examples of innovations which began with the
mission to address social welfare issues, e.g. epidemics but ended up appropriated and
privatised for the sake of individual welfare.
Perhaps a fourth and most constrained form of entrepreneurial state would be a neo-
liberal or libertarian state. The latter would not allow any extensive risk-taking for
innovation beyond defence and police services on the grounds that it would be episte-
mologically impossible and morally indefensible. Although previous forms of entrepre-
neurial state seem to assume unlimited knowledge that allows for market intervention, a
neo-liberal or libertarian state assumes strict epistemological limitations. Such
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limitations would prevent successful intervention in the market for the sake of mission-
oriented innovation, let alone creating the market. The focus of innovation policy would
be on growth by means of free competition of technology-based firms. In addition, a
neo-liberal or libertarian state would be incompatible with any redistributive policies
based on the returns of successful innovations. This incompatibility raises the question
of the relevance of the entrepreneurial state argument for theWestern capitalist world. A
number of capitalist countries have been taken over by the neo-liberal state ideology and
therefore now fail to envisage any substantial entrepreneurial activity taking place
outside the market realm. In the context of neo-liberalism, innovation policy tends to
be technical and depoliticised given the state’s withdrawal from interventionary macro-
economic policy. Quite often, state initiatives for macro-economic intervention are
branded as illiberal or are criticised on epistemological grounds. Why would one focus
on reforming the Western capitalist world through the entrepreneurial state argument
instead of shifting efforts to making radical changes of the capitalist mode of production
and the social division of labour? The entrepreneurial state argument appears to distract
innovation theorists from the real causes of unjust innovation and development namely
the contradictory foundations of capitalism itself.
If it is true that the abstract entrepreneurial state can in fact never take any
unconstrained form of the state, then it must be also true that the strategic vision of
risk-taking can always be conditional on and constrained by the missions and key
functions that each form of the state is legitimised to perform. Given such conditions
and constraints of legitimacy, we might argue the following: first, some states (e.g.
authoritarian, socialist, welfare states) might be legitimate to openly become more
entrepreneurial than some other states (e.g. liberal, neo-liberal, libertarian states);
second, entrepreneurial interventions of some states (especially liberal or neo-liberal
states) might not be sustained for a long time. These states are bound to be short-term
‘institutional entrepreneurs’ due to lack of legitimacy that arises as a result of their
failing to maintain neutrality towards particular innovations and/or firms (i.e. picking
up winners) or as a result of their failing to control the impact of these innovations on
fundamental freedoms (e.g. digital surveillance). The issue of temporality of some
entrepreneurial states was first raised by Schumpeter who perceived industrial policy as
epochal. However, he emphasised reasons such as the long-run primacy of market
forces rather than reasons of legitimacy.
To put it another way, the mission-oriented innovations of say neo-liberal states
would always be different from those of say welfare states in terms of depth and
temporality. Having said that, all missions have something in common. That is their
centralised character. Whether authoritarianism or democratic, all missions tend to
require centralised organisation that characterises R&D. Wilson et al. (2007: p. 2)
‘… call this approach to organising R&D “mission mode” and define it by four
characteristics: strong commitment backed by sufficient resources, a clear and politi-
cally compelling goal, centralised leadership with control over resources, and tight
focus on a restricted set of tasks’. Historical mission efforts such as The Manhattan
Project (i.e. the mission to develop the first nuclear weapons during World War II) and
The War on Cancer in 1971 (i.e. the mission to develop treatment for cancer) in the
USA were clearly centralised. Therefore, it is crucial to avoid separating mission-
oriented innovations from the state. This observation leads to the following position: an
abstract entrepreneurial state that engages in risk-taking activities and creates a new
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vision for innovation can never receive legitimacy in concrete terms unless it is tied
with one of the specific politico-theoretical justifications/forms of the state. However,
in doing so, an entrepreneurial state has to endorse innovation as a predominantly
political process that promotes key functions and missions of the state. To put it another
way, political institutions appear to exercise strong pressure over the directions taken
by certain innovations, whether authoritarian, liberal capitalist or indeed democratic
directions.
5 Innovation as a political process and the question of fairness
Let us now assume an entrepreneurial state that is tied with and constrained by the form
of the welfare state. As has been already argued, any risk-taking strategy by such state
would have to be justified on the grounds of maximisation of social welfare. Of course,
a risk-taking strategy can mean many things. In Mazzucato’s theory, it is about
‘Knightian uncertainty’. Indeed, Knight (1921) defined entrepreneurship in terms of
risk-taking. The entrepreneur is a person willing to put his/her financial security on the
line and take risks in the name of a big idea (Mazzucato 2014). This definition of
entrepreneurship is different from Schumpeter’s one. Schumpeter rejects the idea that
entrepreneurship is about taking on risk. In his Theory of Economic Development
(1983: p. 137), he argues:
The entrepreneur is never the risk bear…The one who gives credit comes to grief
if the undertaking fails…
Clearly, Schumpeter’s definition of entrepreneurship is built upon the Austrian School
of Economics’ theory of human action and particularly the notion of human alertness to
profit in the market (Von Mises 1949; Kirzner 1973). Profit opportunities come with
risk, but entrepreneurs tend to shift such risk to credit providers. Entrepreneurs mainly
focus on discovering or creating new needs and consumer preferences. If Schumpeter is
right in what he argues, then Mazzucato’s position is open to discussion. That is to say,
the state (especially the liberal and neo-liberal state) cannot play the role of entrepre-
neur in Schumpeterian terms but rather exercise some limited entrepreneurial functions,
including financing new ventures through limited taxation. The state can play the role
of industrial leader for a short period of time in order to coordinate the introduction of
new technologies into a historically established setting. As Ebner (2009: p. 370) points
out ‘… in Business Cycles, Schumpeter maintains that the state may exercise entrepre-
neurial function in two ways: first-order entrepreneurship involves the enforcing of
rules that promote innovation activities of the private sector; whereas second-order
entrepreneurship reflects selective policy interventions and the promotion of innovation
in public enterprises’.
To put it another way, it is the taxpayers who are ultimate risk bearers of state
entrepreneurship and innovation. But the taxpayers cannot be considered as a uniform
group of binary assessors of whether the risk-taking in mission-oriented innovations is
in line with their expected functions of the state. In fact, they are politically fragmented
and hence their views about which precisely functions the state should fulfil may be
different. However, even if such differences exist and there are complex trade-offs of
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costs and benefits, the taxpayers often tend to shape the public opinion for or against
specific state plans. If the public opinion is against the state’s plans for mission-oriented
innovation, then such plans are illegitimate and cannot be implemented without
substantial political cost for government. In the case of the welfare state, this implies
that some taxpayers might bear more risk than others for the sake of welfare
maximisation through mission-oriented innovation. Therefore, individual rights might
be violated, and fairness might be questioned. Take for example a risky investment into
a public laboratory for developing a new molecular entity for lung cancer. Some
taxpayers might adopt Dworkin’s liberal egalitarian position (Dworkin 1981a, 1981b)
claiming that it is unfair to pay for a pharmaceutical innovation that benefits a small
group of irresponsible people who have been abusing smoking. Some other taxpayers
might question the method through which the impact of pharmaceutical innovation on
social welfare can be objectively measured.
In fact, whatever form of state the entrepreneurial state is tied with and constrained
by, innovation has to be endorsed as a political process. This implies that the costs and
rewards of risky investments in new technologies, whether pharmaceuticals, ICTs,
biotechnologies, green technologies and artificial intelligence (AI), have to be distrib-
uted according to the political principles of justice which each model of the state adopts
as a guidance for its main functions. Thus, if a liberal capitalist state adopts say
Rawlsian egalitarian principles of ‘justice as fairness’, i.e. ‘the difference principle’
and the ‘equal liberty’ principle (Rawls 1972), then the costs and rewards of innovation
should be arranged in such way that the worse off in society can be made as well off as
possible, i.e. maximising the liberty, opportunity, income and wealth of the least
advantaged. By contrast, if a liberal capitalist state adopts, say Nozickian individualist
principles, i.e. the ‘principle of justice in acquisition’ and the principle of ‘justice in
transfer’ (Nozick 1974), then the costs and rewards of innovation should be arranged in
such way that each individual’s right to self-ownership is not violated, i.e. strengthen-
ing private ownership rights over the fruits of each individual’s talents and capacities.
The historical fact that liberal and neo-liberal states in the Western capitalist world,
including the USA and the UK, imposed on their taxpayers risks for the development of
radical technologies while they failed to distribute rewards equally, is very much due to
their political adoption of implausible principles of justice, i.e. non-egalitarian princi-
ples based on notions of absolute self-ownership and individual freedom (Papaioannou
2010; Cohen 1995). These predominantly individualist principles have led to claims of
individual appropriation of public resources and therefore to privatisation of rewards of
collective endeavours for new technological innovation. As Mazzucato (2014: p. 165)
rightly observes:
Often the only return that the state gets for its risky investments are the indirect
benefits of higher tax receipts that result from the growth that is generated by
those investments. But given the presence of different tax holes and the fact that
tax receipts often do not accurately reflect the source of earnings (e.g. income vs
capital gains) taxes have proved a difficult way for the state to get back its return
for innovation investments.
In fact, what has proved difficult for the state to do in the USA and the UK is to move
away from the liberal myth of neutrality towards conceptions of technological goods
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and ideals. As Block (2011) shows, the neo-liberal state on the one hand claimed
consistency with the political ideal of the free market as a fundamental mechanism of
neutral and fair distribution of resources and, on the other, picked up winners through
industrial policies which favoured specific technologies, e.g. ICT, biotechnology and
nanotechnology.
This contradistinction of the neo-liberal state exacerbated inequality that is directly
or indirectly linked to technological innovation. For example, given the complex ‘co-
evolutionary dynamics’ between new technologies and inequalities (Cozzens and
Kaplinsky 2009), the neo-liberal state, in the name of neutrality, refused to provide
social safety net to those affected by the skill-biased technological change, e.g. artificial
intelligence (AI). But such change was, in fact, financed by the neo-liberal state by
means of taxation. Taxpayers’ money was diverted from social welfare to skill-biased
technologies as a result of non-neutral political decisions of the neo-liberal state. In this
sense, innovation as such was endorsed as a neo-liberal political process that could
make winners in the market better off and losers worse off.
6 The role of the state in socially just innovation
Mazzucato’s argument of the entrepreneurial state implicitly identifies the risk-reward
nexus of the innovation process within contemporary capitalism as socially unjust.
According to her ‘…when the appropriation of rewards outstrips the bearing of risk in
the innovation process the result is inequity’ (Mazzucato 2014: p. 185). Mazzucato
does not provide any account of why such inequity is wrong or what a socially just
innovation process would look like. Therefore, two questions remain open. What is
actually a socially just innovation? What is the role of the state in promoting it? Both
questions require us to move away from narrow-minded economistic arguments about
innovation and towards broader politico-theoretical arguments about generation and
diffusion of new technologies. The first point to stress is that, contrary to various liberal
egalitarian schools of thought, social justice is predominantly about social relations and
not solely about distributions of primary goods, functionings, resources, capabilities,
opportunities or well-being. As Anderson (1999) argues, inequality refers not so much
to unfair distributions of goods as to social relations between superior and inferior
persons. Distributional and relational inequalities are of course different sides of the
same currency of justice. As Scanlon (2018: p. 28) points out, those who are better off
and those who are worse off are deprived of ‘…the important good of being able to
relate to each other as equals’. Whatever material resources or capabilities influence
such relations, the fundamental concern of justice is that those of superior rank think
they are entitled to inflict violence on inferiors to exclude or segregate them from social
life, to treat them with contempt, to force them to obey, work without reciprocation and
abandon their cultures (ibid: p. 312).
Indeed, these are what Young (1990) describes as faces of oppression, including
marginalisation, hierarchy, exploitation, domination and cultural imperialism. Social
egalitarian justice seeks to abolish all faces of oppression so that it can establish:
…a social order in which persons stand in relations of equality… live together in
a democratic community, as opposed to a hierarchical one. Democracy is here
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understood as collective self-determination by means of open discussion among
equals, in accordance with rules acceptable to all.
An egalitarian perspective on socially just innovation implies all persons involved in
generating products and/or processes new to the firm, new to the market and/or new to
the world, including innovators, regulators and publics, stand in relations of equality to
others. Thus, they are able to generate and apply knowledge for innovation in conditions
of equal self-respect, overcoming knowledge-driven hierarchical divisions and top-
down dominated value chains. In an egalitarian innovative society, everyone’s situation
and interests in innovation ought to be taken into account in an ‘impartial’way. Thus, no
one could end up worse off or disadvantaged in relation to others. To put it another way,
an equal and, at the same time, innovative society is one that has the right quality of
relations between all persons and institutions involved in innovation systems. This does
not mean that the moral and political objective of equal distribution of material
resources, goods, opportunities and capabilities (i.e. currencies of social justice) should
be abandoned. In fact, equal distribution of specific currencies of social justice is crucial
as long as it influences positively the process of equalisation of social relations of
innovation. One could think of this process as a ‘technical democracy’ (Callon et al.
2009: p. 36) that reduces uncertainly in the innovation decision-making by involving
everyone. Another could think of the process of equalisation of relations of innovation
as a joint inquiry of innovators, regulators and publics that can realise a common interest
in social justice in Deweyan terms. For Dewey (1927), there is no such thing as a priori
norm. Thus, justice as such appears to be an inquiry for criteria for what counts as a just
outcome of innovation. This inquiry involves moral and political judgement.
In her last work, Responsibility for Justice, Young (2011) argues that the moral and
political judgement that there is structural injustice of social relations and material
resources implies some kind of responsibility. As she explains ‘To judge a circum-
stance unjust implies that we understand it at least partly as humanly caused and entails
the claim that something should be done to rectify it’ (ibid: p. 95). This is exactly where
the state comes in. Its role is to respond to citizen’s claim for justice by developing
policies which can rectify unjust circumstances. However, not all different forms of the
state discussed in this paper are able to play this role. For example, the neo-liberal state
in contemporary capitalism considers the unregulated market as responsible to rectify
unjust circumstances through a spontaneous process of competition (Hayek 1960,
1967). Thus, in fact, when the neo-liberal state allows the market to spontaneously
socialise the risks of innovation and privatise the rewards of successful technologies, it
commits structural injustice. Therefore, it should bear responsibility for this injustice.
Bearing responsibility means that the state understands its moral obligation to transform
structural processes to make the outcome of innovation less unjust. Although it is true
that the state is not a single entity and structural injustices are produced by a large
number of actors and institutions, it is also true that specific industrial and social
policies could be held to account for developing unjust circumstances in knowledge
generation and diffusion of new technologies. In Young’s theory, the state and its
policies are not independent of us. Therefore, government policy to promote social
justice in innovation would require the active support of communities of innovators and
publics in order to be effective. These communities also bear responsibility in relation
to risky innovations which either fail to meet the needs of disadvantaged people or
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produce rewards for a tiny minority of well off and privileged actors in innovation
systems. All innovations are the result of human actions and not natural forces. In this
sense, all actors involved in innovation systems, including innovators, publics and the
state, bear political responsibility for those innovations which are unjust and therefore
are obliged to correct the injustice. Avoiding such responsibility means that social and
political actors are happy to continue contributing to structural innovation processes
that make some people vulnerable to deprivation and/or domination.
Let us take as an example the ‘distribution of basic income to all’ proposal or else
universal basic income (UBI). This has been debated globally and prompted pilots in
several countries, including low- and middle-income countries. The main idea here is
that government bears responsibility for supporting new disruptive technologies which
make some people worse off, e.g. unemployed and therefore pays a basic income to all
members of political community on an individual basis without work or other
requirements. Although Van Parijs (1995) has initially defended this idea on the
grounds of liberal neutrality towards competing conceptions of the good (e.g. the fact
that some people prefer to work and some other people prefer not to work; some people
have expensive tastes and others have not expensive tastes), the last two years, UBI has
been promoted as a concrete social policy for rectifying innovation injustice. The
argument has been that advances in technology, including current automated machines,
robots and artificial intelligence (AI), tend to impact unfairly on labour markets,
displacing not only relatively low-skilled jobs but also high-skilled services. This
argument has been backed by wealth of empirical evidence (Zehavi and Breznitz
2017) which demonstrate the beneficiaries of accelerated innovation are just a few
high-skilled workers, whereas the losers are many. For instance, in a recent paper,
Alden and Litan (2017: p. 1) discuss the US workforce, arguing that:
Much attention has been paid to the displacement of relatively low-skilled jobs,
as autonomous vehicles replace track and taxi drivers, online retail replaces
physical stores, and self-checkout machines continue to replace cashiers. But
advances in technology will leave few segments of the labour market untouched:
new computer programmes are replacing some forms of entry-level legal work
and investment planning, while machines with rudimentary artificial intelligence
capabilities are already writing basic news stories.
Although this argument may be at odds with other researchers, including Acemoglu
and Autor (2011) and Goos et al. (2014), who observe job polarization at both the
bottom and the top of the income distribution, it is almost certain that advances in
automation and AI technologies will particularly affect developing countries. This is
because of the kind of jobs common in these countries, e.g. manual agricultural work,
which are susceptible to automation (Schlogl and Sumner 2018). The World Bank
(WB) estimates 1.8 billion jobs or two-thirds of the current labour force of developing
countries to be under threat by automation technologies (WB 2016). A number of other
international agencies, including the International Labour Organization (ILO), have
raised the issue of technological threat to the future of employment and the conse-
quences of de-industrialisation for developing countries (ILO 2017). Schlogl and
Sumner (2018) consider, for example, the case of Indonesia where an estimated half
of all jobs are automatable using existing technologies. Thus, the automation of
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motorway toll booths has placed in risk 20,000 jobs, leading the country’s Minister of
Finance at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to make the case for UBI (Jakarta
Post 2017).
Indeed, given the pace of advances in automation and AI technology, one
plausible way to rectify unjust ‘creative destruction’ and to maintain reproduction
of society as a whole might be to distribute the benefits of technological innova-
tion in a form of UBI. Such distribution would probably reduce inequality in some
relations of innovation but would certainly not eliminate it. That is to say, UBI, on
the one hand, would guarantee to everyone freedom from poverty and allow
people to engage in non-market-oriented social innovation but on the other hand,
would not guarantee to everyone end of oppression and equal respect. Ongoing
UBI social experiments in various countries indicate positive impacts on peoples’
living conditions, food, security and nutrition, education and productivity, but not
on elimination of oppressive gender relations, exploitative and other unjust
situations. For instance, Hanlon et al. (2010) demonstrate that various cash
transfers in emerging innovative economies such as Mexico, Brazil, South Africa,
China and Indonesia have provided social protection and security to the worse off
or disadvantaged, raising their incomes and stimulating demand locally. However,
redistribution of wealth from the better off to the worse off has only marginally
empowered young people, women and communities of colour. In South Africa
and India, for example, discriminations based on colour, gender and caste have not
been eliminated. The same holds for developed countries such as the UK and the
USA where unequal recognition and respect of certain categories of people,
including women, influences relations of employment and pay conditions. To
put it another way, context matters. As Srinivas and Sutz (2008) show, socially
just innovations take different forms in different contexts and conditions of
scarcity. They often co-exist with redistributive policies of the state. There is a
need for idiosyncratic solutions to problems of innovation injustice.
Justice in innovation cannot be only achieved through the implementation of
redistributive policies such as UBI alone. Even if the utopia of monthly allowance
enough to live on and deal with the creative destruction of new AI technologies funded
by the state could become reality in different contexts (Bregman 2017), the utopia of
justice in innovation would not be fully realised unless relations of all actors involved
could be equalised. The role of the state in promoting socially just innovation does not
then stop in progressive redistribution of resources such as UBI and other benefits of
innovation. Indeed, as Mazzucato (2014) suggests, there is strong justification for
socialising the returns of state investment in successful technological innovation.
However, narrow this suggestion may be (in the sense that there are many ways in
which benefits of technological innovation accrue to taxpayers), the fact that ‘… over
20 per cent of corporate profits in the UK go to the public pursue in the form of
corporation tax …’ (Westlake 2014: p. 8) does not devaluate Mazzucato’s suggestion
as Westlake (ibid) seems to think. On the contrary, it enforces her argument for justice
in the distribution of benefits of innovation.
However, a socially just state ought to go beyond that, adopting principles of
justice which focus on equalisation of social relations in the innovation process.
Such principles are not necessarily distributive (i.e. they do not regard people as
equal as long as they enjoy equal amount of resources, opportunities, capabilities)
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but rather relational (i.e. they regard people as equal as long as they enjoy mutual
respect, reciprocation and recognition). Political theorists such as Young (1990),
Taylor (1994), Honneth (1995) and Fraser (1997) have consistently elaborated
these principles challenging liberal equalitarian arguments of distributive justice.
Thus, these theorists built their arguments on claims about equality, participation
and recognition made by public activists and campaigners in different contexts. It
follows that a socially just state in innovation ought to promote public actions and
campaigns which aim to eliminate oppression, arbitrary violence or physical
coercion, marginalisation and hierarchical domination from the very process of
knowledge generation and development of new technologies (Papaioannou 2018).
Although the material basis of these relations is given, other factors, such as race,
gender, caste, culture, are determinants. Therefore, the role of the state in social
innovation ought to be both contextualised and holistic.
7 Conclusion
This paper has reflected on the recent debate of the entrepreneurial state and its role in
technological innovation and social justice. In doing so, it has examined the risk-taking
argument of innovation theorists, insisting that they should not abstract from a holistic
politico-theoretical approach to the state. Classical, modern and contemporary theorists
of the state teach us that there are concrete forms of the state that any entrepreneurial
and risk-taking strategy has to be tied with in order to achieve legitimacy. Inevitably,
some forms of the state are legitimate to be more entrepreneurial than some other forms
of the state. Thus, authoritarian, socialist and welfare states appear to be more legiti-
mate in performing entrepreneurial functions than liberal, neo-liberal and libertarian
states. The latter are bound to be short-term entrepreneurial states due to their lack of
legitimacy. By contrast, the former are bound to be long-term entrepreneurial states due
to legitimacy they can achieve when their mission-oriented activities produce socially
just outcomes. This implies that innovation as such is a political process guided by
certain principles of justice and contributing to legitimate functions of the state. The
historical experience of the neo-liberal state and its contradictory process of innovation
that increases inequality, reinforce the importance of justice in the generation and
diffusion of new technologies. However, such justice in innovation ought to go beyond
distribution and redistribution of resources, and towards the very social relations of
generation of new knowledge and technologies which determine the exclusion of
certain actors, e.g. the poor, indigenous people and women. An innovative society in
which persons stand in relations to equality demands not only elimination of maldis-
tribution but also of misrecognition, marginalisation and exclusion from its innovation
system. Future research should explore in detail the idea of justice in innovation as a
relational process of progressive society.
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